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ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE 
INSTRUMENTS: AUTHORIZING AND 
IMPLEMENTING PRICE LEVEL ADJUSTED 
MORTGAGES 
The residential real estate market is in the midst of a slump,' in 
part because of inflated sales prices2 and interest rates. 3 Standard mort-
gage instruments ("SMls"), and other traditional financing techniques, 
were not designed for today's inflationary economy. These techniques 
reduce the availability of real estate financing, and thus real estate sales, 
by causing a mismatch between household income and the real cost 
of mortgage obligations, an often insuperable barrier during the early 
years of the debt. 4 These problems have spurred reconsideration of 
residential financing methods to make home ownership more attainable. 
An important solution has been increased use of alternative mort-
gage instruments ("AMis") to more closely match income and debt.5 
One such instrument may prove particularly helpful to households an-
ticipating steadily increasing disposable income: the price level adjusted 
I. In 1980, housing starts totaled only 1.30 million units, a 26% decline from the 1.75 million 
starts recorded in 1979. FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD JOUR-
NAL, ANNUAL REPORT 1980, at 21 (1981). Excluding custom-built or mobile homes, 1980 new 
home sales totaled 531,000 units, a 25% decrease from the 1979 level of 709,000 units. Id. Existing-
home sales declined by 23%, from 3.75 million units in 1979 to 2.88 million units in 1980. Id. 
In 1981, total housing starts decreased an additional 15%, to I. 10 million units. U.S. DEP'T 
OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS S-7 (May 1982). New home sales decreased by 
20%, to 426,000 units. Id. 
2. From 1977 to 1981 median sales prices for new homes rose more than 41 %, from $48,800 
to $68,900. In that same period average sales prices rose more than 53%, from $54,200 to $83,000. 
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEPT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CONSTRUCTION 
REPORTS: NEW ONE-FAMILY HOUSES SOLD AND FOR SALE 7 (Apr. 1982). 
3. Mortgage interest rates have reached unprecedented levels in recent years. The average 
contract interest rate on conventional first mortgage loans for the purchase of new single-family 
homes rose more than 60%, from 8.8% in 1977 to 14.1% in mid-1981. UNITED STATES DEP'T 
OF COMMERCE, 1981 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 772 (1981). 
As these interest rates and sales prices increase, fewer first-time home purchasers can qualify 
for mortgage financing. See, e.g., The Outlook For Housing And The Thrifts, 1980: Hearing 
Before The Joint Economic Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1979) (statement of Herman Smith) 
[hereinafter cited as Outlook for Housing]; N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1981, § 3, at I, col. I. 
4. Traditional mortgage financing components, such as those used with SMis, discussed more 
fully infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text, use identical monthly payments over the life of 
the loan. Many households, however, have substantially increasing disposable income during 
that period, thus causing the unfortunate "mismatch effect." See infra text following note 18. 
5. AMis allow for modifications in certain features of SMis to provide flexibility to bor-
rowers and increase mortgage availability. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. 
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mortgage, or "PLAM." By eliminating an inflation factor built into 
most mortgage instruments, 6 the PLAM brings mortgage payments by 
upwardly mobile households more in line with their income; early 
payments are relatively low while later payments track increasing 
household income. 
Of the institutions authorized to make mortgage funds available, 7 
only federally-chartered and a small minority of state-chartered sav-
ings and loan associations are presently authorized to make PLAM 
loans. 8 This is due, in part, to a variety of legal and underwriting prob-
6. An "inflation premium" must be added to any interest rate so that the lender can preserve 
the value of future mortgage payments. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
7. Major financial institutions such as savings and loan associations, commercial banks, and 
other thrift institutions have been the primary source of conventional mortgage funds for owner-
occupied housing and pay interest on deposit accounts to attract funds for mortgage lending. 
See M. MADISON & J. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE§§ 2.01-2.02(5) (1981); UNITED 
STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 478; UNITED 
STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES 
TO 1970, at 647-48 (1975). 
At the end of the fourth quarter of 1981, the amount of mortgage debt on one-to-four family 
dwellings (in billions of dollars and percent of total national mortgage debt) was: 
Major Financial Institutions 
Savings and loan associations 
Commercial banks 
Mutual savings banks 
Life insurance companies 
Federal Agencies, Mortgage Pools, and Others 
FEDERAL RESERVE BD., FED. RESERVE BULL. A41 (May 1982). 
691.4 (67.70/o) 
433.3 
172.5 
68.2 
17.4 
330.1 (32.3%) 
8. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has authorized member associations to issue PLAMs. 
47 Fed. Reg. 36,618 (1982). Several state-chartered lenders are authorized to make any loans 
within the power of a federally chartered savings and loan association. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-448(3) (West 1974) (insured or guaranteed loans may be made in accordance with the 
applicable federal savings and loan association rules and regulations); CAL. C1v. CoDE § 1916.12 
(West Supp. 1982) (effective December 31, 1983) (state financial institution mortgage lending 
authority equivalent to federal financial institution authority); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-41-119(4) 
(Bradford Supp. 1981) (state-chartered savings and loan association may make any type of loan 
for any purpose that a federal savings and loan association may be authorized to make); IDAHO 
CODE § 26-1934 (1977) (state-chartered savings and loan association may make any loan a federal-
ly chartered savings and loan association is authorized to make); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 17, 
§ 3138(c) (1981) (loans insured or guaranteed wholly or in part may be made in accordance 
with applicable federal savings and loan association law); Miss. CODE ANN. § 81-12-49(r) (Har-
rison, Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982) (state savings and loan associations have the same lending powers 
as federal associations, as may be prescribed by state regulation); Mo. REV. STAT. § 369.144(7) 
(Vernon Supp. 1982) (director of division of savings and loan association supervision may promul-
gate regulations enabling state savings and loan associations to make any loan that a federally-
chartered savings and loan association may make); N.D. CENT. CODE § 7-02-14 (Smith Supp. 
1981) (state savings and loan associations with accounts insured by the Federal Savings & Loan 
Insurance Corporation may make loans on the same terms as federal associations); UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 7-7-5.1 (1971) (state-chartered savings-and-loan associations authorized to make the same 
Joans as federal associations). Because state authorization may hinge on federal insurance or 
guarantees and no federal agency presently has authority to insure PLAMs, several of these states 
may not yet utilize PLAMs. -
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lems that may outweigh the theoretical advantages of PLAM financing. 
This Note evaluates these legal and underwriting problems and pro-
poses legal measures to accommodate PLAM financing. Part I discusses 
the development and advantages of the PLAM. Part II analyzes the 
legal and practical underwriting objections to PLAM financing, in-
cluding interest regulations, tax ramifications, and commercial desira-
bility. Part II also suggests reform in various state banking statutes 
and lending practices to enhance the attractiveness and feasibility of 
this new mortgage instrument. This Note concludes that authorization 
of price level adjusted mortgages would be an important addition to 
the present array of mortgage financing instruments. 
I. THE PRICE LEVEL ADJUSTED MORTGAGE 
The PLAM has been widely discussed in residential finance literature. 9 
PLAMs have been used in South American, European, and Middle 
Eastern countries where high annual inflation rates are common. 10 
Although the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has recently authorized 
federally-chartered savings and loan associations to offer PLAMs, 11 
the move toward PLAM financing has been slow. This section will 
show why the acceptance of PLAM financing would be advantageous 
for many households and how PLAM financing works. 
A. Development of the PLAM 
The price level adjusted mortgage, like most AMls, developed in 
response to a variety of shortcomings in the standard mortgage instru-
ment. SMls have a long fixed term, an unvarying nominal interest rate, 
and full amortization. 12 The borrower thus repays the SMI with level 
payments over the entire term. The SMI was designed to operate in 
a stable, inflation-free environment with little risk of long term devalua-
9. See, e.g., Cassidy, Price-Leve/ Adjusted Mortgages Versus Other Mortgage Instruments, 
14 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J. 3 (Jan. 1981); Cowan & Foley, New Trends in Residential 
Mortgage Finance, 13 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1075, 1085-87, 1093 (1978); Hyer & Kearl, 
Legal Impediments to Mortgage Innovation, 6 REAL EST. L.J. 211, 216-38 (1978). See generally 
1-3 ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS RESEARCH STUDY (D. Kaplan ed. 1977) [hereinafter 
cited as AMIRS]; Lessard & Modigliani, Inflation and the Housing Market: Problems and Potential 
Solutions, in NEW MORTGAGE DESIGNS FOR STABLE HOUSING IN AN INFLATIONARY ECONOMY 33-37, 
41-44 (1975) [hereinafter cited as NEW MORTGAGE DESIGNS]. 
10. See Anderson & Lessard, Price-Level-Adjusted Mortgages in Brazil, NEw MORTGAGE 
DESIGNS, supra at 115; Cukierman, Price-Level-Adjusted Mortgages in Israel, id. at 159; Kouri, 
The Financing of Housing in Finland With Special Reference to the Application of the Index 
Clause, id. at 143. 
11. See supra note 8. 
12. See Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 212; Cowan & Foley, supra note 9, at 1078. 
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tion of mortgage payments. 13 Quite unexpectedly, modem price inflation 
and high, inflated interest rates have turned these SMis into barriers 
to home-ownership. 
Because financing costs constitute the greatest home-ownership 
expense, 14 interest charges in particular bar many potential buyers from 
entering the housing market, especially during periods of high inflation. 1 s 
In establishing mortgage interest rates, SMI lenders include an "infla-
tion premium," equal to an estimate of future inflation, to protect 
the value of future payments. 16 If this premium is too high - as it 
13. See Kaplan, Marcis & Cassidy, AM/RS: An Overview and Summary, in 1 AMIRS, supra 
note 9, at 2; see also Cohn & Fischer, Alternative Mortgage Designs, in NEW MORTGAGE 
DESIGNS, supra note 9, at 53-62. 
14. The interest payments alone on a 30-year, $50,000 SMI at 8½0Jo come to over $88,000. 
At l 70Jo, the interest comes to more than $205,000, or 4130Jo of the initial mortgage debt. 
15. There is a significant correlation between the annual inflation rate and housing starts, 
partly because of increased housing costs, partly because of decreased consumer borrowing power 
which in turn further depresses the housing market. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
This is particularly noticeable in the years 1974-76 and since 1978. 
Year Total Housing Starts Average Percentage 
(thousands of units) Consumer Price Index 
Increase 
1965 1509.7 1.7 
1966 1295.6 2.9 
1967 1221.9 2.8 
1968 1545.4 4.2 
1969 1499.5 5.4 
1970 1469.0 5.9 
1971 2084.5 4.3 
1972 2378.5 3.3 
1973 2057.5 6.2 
1974 1352.5 11.0 
1975 1171.4 9.1 
1976 1549.7 5.8 
1977 1988.8 6.5 
1978 2020.3 7.7 
1979 1750.0 11.3 
Outlook for Housing, supra note 3, at 42; see also FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, supra note 
1, at 22. 
16. Interest payments over the mortgage term compensate the lender for providing the initial 
mortgage principal advance, so the lender's expectation about the future cost of money and 
potential rates of return is an important factor in determining long-term interest rates. Thus, 
in a world of no present or anticipated inflation, lenders would charge only the rate of return 
they desire on the principal amount, a "real" rate of interest. If, however, the lender anticipates 
a future inflationary economy which proportionately devalues the expected "real" return, the 
lender will include some inflation "insurance" to offset potential devaluation. Recent inflationary 
trends, see supra note 15, have caused lenders to charge a high "nominal" interest rate that 
includes not only a real rate of return but a substantial "inflation premium" as well to protect 
the purchasing power of future mortgage payments. See Sharplin, Real-Dollar Mortgages Will 
Solve the Housing Crisis, 11 REAL EST. REv. 50, 51-52 (Winter 1982); see also Cassidy, supra 
note 9, at 3; Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 215; Nosari & Lewis, How Usury Laws Affect 
Real Estate Development, 9 REAL EST. L.J. 30 (1980); Comment, The New Mortgages: A Fune-
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might be in an unstable inflationary economy - the borrower is even 
less able to afford mortgage costs than in an inflation-free setting. 
The standard mortgage instrument itself further exacerbates the ef-
fect of high, inflated interest rates on new home ownership. Borrowers 
generally have preferred SMis with equal monthly payments over the 
entire loan term because sustained inflation makes later payments 
relatively ''cheaper.'' 11 Because the inflation premium must protect the 
lender over the entire term, however, payments in the early years in-
clude interest charges far in excess of actual inflationary devaluation, 
thus causing a payment "tilt." 18 In financial terms, these overcompen-
sating early payments do not incre~se the "real" cost of the mortgage 
over the entire term because inflation devalues later payments. Never-
theless, for a household with modest income, but expectations of future 
income increases, this equal-payment plan has the unfortunate mismatch 
effect of forcing households to expend far more in early years than 
inflation demands, often creating a burden too onerous to bear. Con-
versely, later inflation-devalued payments fall at the time when these 
households could afford greater, not lesser, amounts for housing. 
Recent innovations in federal and state real estate finance have pro-
duced a variety of alternative mortgage instruments capable of alleviating 
tional Legal Analysis, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 95, 97 (1982). When inflation was quite low, 
nominal rates almost matched real rates and a stable financing market persisted. See von 
Furstenberg, Stabilization and Financial Innovation, in 5 OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN HOUSING AND 
COMMUNITY AFFAIRS 5, 10 (1979). Recent fluctuations in the inflation rate have severely disrupted 
this stability. Id. 
17. Because the SMI is repaid with fixed-rate, level payments, initial payments must be in-
creased to offset the declining value of payments over the mortgage term thus creating a • 'financing 
gap" (real cost Jess payments). Using an example of a 30-year, $50,000 mortgage with a 411/o 
real interest rate, the value of payments in the last year of amortization in an inflation-free 
environment equals the real value of initial payments - $239. If the lender adds a 1011/o inflation 
premium, however, the monthly payments jump to $592 yet the present value of the final $592 
payment is only $37. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 6. In addition, if the inflation rate exceeds 1011/o 
in this example, later payments have even lower present value. See Hyer & Kearl, supra note 
9, at 215-16; Lessard & Modigliani, supra note 9, at 15-20; Tucker, The Variable-Rate Graduated-
Payment Mortgage, 4 REAL EsT. REV. 71, 72-73 (Spring 1975). 
18. New home buyers thus retire a disproportionate share of mortgage debt in the early years. 
The tilting effect can be quantified by calculating the percentage of real debt remaining ("lo RD), 
where i = inflation rate and n = years of term elapsed: 
"lo RD= l - lOO% 
(I + i)". 
The following chart illustrates the rate at which the real mortgage debt is retired under an SMI 
assuming various inflation rates: 
Inflation rate 
511/o 8% 10% 15"7o 
Years Elapsed 5 21.65"70 3 I.94"7o 37.91% 50.28"70 
10 38.61 "lo 53.68% 61.45"70 75.28% 
15 51.90% 68.48% 76.06"70 87.71"70 
20 62.31 % 78.55% 85.49% 93.89% 
30 100"70 10011/o 10011/o 100"70 
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some of the SMI mismatch of debt and income. 19 AMis may permit 
adjustment to the interest rate, 20 payment schedule, 21 term, 22 or mort-
gage principal. 23 The PLAM alters the mortgage principal and pro-
vides a way for the upwardly mobile borrower to avoid the onerous 
early-years financing "tilt" while at the same time ensuring the lender 
compensation for the actual effects of inflation. Unlike SMI and AMI 
19. A variety of AMis have been authorized by the federal government. See 47 Fed. Reg. 
36,618 (1982) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board authorization of new instruments keyed to infla-
tion); id. at 36,612 (FHLBB general authorization to make adjustments to the interest rate, pay-
ment, loan balance, or term); see also 46 Fed. Reg. 24,152 (1981) (authorizing national banks 
to provide adjustable interest rate mortgages under regulations issued by the Comptroller of 
the Currency). Many states have authorized some or all of the possible AMls. See, e.g., statutes 
cited supra note 8 (state may utilize any instrument authorized by federal regulation); CAL. C1v. 
CODE §§ 1916.5-.10 (West Supp. 1982) (authority to provide adjustable-payment, adjustable-
rate, and renegotiable-rate mortgage loans); Cow. REv. STAT. § 11-41-115(5) (Supp. 1981) 
(reverse annuity mortgage authorization); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3504C (West Supp. 1982) 
(graduated payment mortgage authorization); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.20 (Subd. 4b) (West Supp. 
1982) (shared appreciation mortgage authorization); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 505(f) (Purdon 
Supp. 1982-83) (variable rate mortgage authorization). 
AMis have become increasingly popular, with 750/o of a recently surveyed lender's group offer-
ing adjustable mortgage loans. See ZABRENSKI & OLIN, CHARACTERISTICS OF ADJUSTABLE MORT-
GAGE LOANS I (1982) (citing a Federal Home Loan Bank Board survey of large associations). 
Fully 700/o of the total number of mortgages issued by the surveyed associations during January 
1982 were adjustable mortgage loans. Id. For a discussion of the historical development of AMis, 
see Iezman, Alternative Mortgage Instruments: Their Effect on Residential Financing, 10 REAL 
EST. L.J. 3 (1981); Levin & Roberts, Future Forms of Financing - Lending Devices Addressed 
to Inflation and Tight Money, in FINANCING REAL ESTATE DURING THE INFLATIONARY 80s, at 
31 (B. Strum ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as FINANCING REAL ESTATE]; Walleser, Balancing the 
Interest: The Changing Complexion of Home Mortgage Financing in America, 31 DRAKE L. 
REV. 1, 16-36 (1981); Comment, supra note 16, at 102-13. 
20. Under a variable-rate mortgage, the interest rate is tied to a base or index reflecting changes 
in the market rate of interest. Mortgage payments may be adjusted periodically by increasing 
or decreasing the loan term and/or the monthly payment though the frequency and magnitude 
of adjustments or total adjustments over the loan term may be restricted by regulation. See 
generally Draper, Alternative Mortgage Instruments, in MORTGAGES AND ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE 
INSTRUMENTS 323-27 (R. Sweat ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS]; Iez-
man, supra note 19, at 6-8; Sweat, Mortgages and Alternative Mortgage Instruments, ALTER-
NATIVE INSTRUMENTS, supra, at 19-20. 
The renegotiable rate mortgage is generally issued for a single long term and secures a series 
of short-term loans of three to five years. Interest rate adjustments occur at the end of each 
short-term loan period. The loan is automatically renewable and must be retired in equal install-
ments during the loan period which fully amortizes the debt over the longer mortgage term. 
See generally Draper, supra, at 327-29; lezman, supra note 19, at 12-17; Sweat, supra, at 23. 
21. Under a graduated payment mortgage, scheduled payments begin at a level lower than 
a comparable fixed-term mortgage instrument and gradually rise to a constant level exceeding 
the fixed-term mortgage amount sufficient to amortize the remaining principal balance and un-
paid interest. Although monthly payments vary during early amortization years, the principal, 
interest rate, and mortgage term are fixed at loan origination. See generally Draper, supra note 
20, at 329-34; Iezman, supra note 19, at 8-10; Sweat, supra note 20, at 25-26. 
22. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, for example, has authorized lenders to provide 
instruments adjusting the loan term in accordance with interest rate fluctuations. 47 Fed. Reg. 
36,618 (1982). 
23. The same regulation authorizing term variation allows for manipulation of the mortgage 
principal. See id. The PLAM is the most obvious example. 
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lenders, the PLAM lender advances funds at a constant real interest 
rate that does not include an inflation premium. 24 Inflation compensa-
tion, if any, comes through periodic adjustments of the outstanding 
principal balance. 25 
B. Mechanics of the PLAM 
The PLAM, like most AMis, attempts to eliminate inaccurate infla-
tion estimates and the tilting effect. It does this by adapting the features 
of many AMis to the income potential of upwardly mobile households. 
For instance, most AMis do not remove completely the tilting effect; 
notwithstanding periodic adjustments of the interest rate or mortgage 
payment, there often remains some inflation premium in nominal in-
terest rates. 26 The PLAM eliminates all interest rate inflation premiums 
by setting a "real" rate of return. This has the salutary effect of 
eliminating the payment tilt and substantially reducing initial mortgage 
payments. 21 Moreover, the inflation premium not only hurt borrowers 
when it was set too high, but lenders when it was set too low. 28 Remov-
ing this factor assures the lender a predictable rate of return. 
The inflation factor does not, of course, disappear; inflation still 
devalues "real" interest payments that must somehow be compensated. 
To do this, the PLAM adjusts the underlying principal according to 
24. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 3. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 6-7. A majority of surveyed associations priced adjustable mortgage loans within 
½ to 1 OJo of fixed rate mortgages; 130Jo offered the same rate for both. See ZABRENSKI & OLIN, 
supra note 19, at 2. 
27. Using a $50,000 SMI with a 140Jo nominal interest rate (40Jo real rate of return, IOOJo 
inflation), the sum of monthly payments during the first year of amortization would be $7,104. 
The sum of monthly PLAM payments over that same year (40Jo real interest rate) would be $2,868. 
Initial PLAM note payments will also be significantly less than graduated-payment mortgage 
or variable rate mortgage payments during inflationary periods. See Cassidy, supra note 9, at 
6-10. Variable-rate mortgages, for example, operate on the assumption that lenders will lend 
at lower initial rates because they are assured of the current rate of interest on money. See Levin 
& Roberts, supra note 19, at 32; Strum, Economics of Variable Rate Mortgages, in FINANCING 
REAL ESTATE, supra note 19, at 25. Rates have not decreased substantially, however, because 
rates are reduced to short-term commitment rates which often equal or exceed long-term rates. 
Sharplin, supra note 16, at 54. Although early graduated-payment mortgage payments are decreased 
and later payments are increased relative to an SMI, the graduated-payment mortgage interest 
rate is fixed. Consequently, the fixed-rate mortgage includes an inflation premium which generates 
artificially high payments to be distributed over the loan term. Id. at 53. 
28. Inflation-induced interest rates have not yielded anticipated returns for lenders. While 
the actual return on averaged loans from 1950-59 at 5.020Jo nominal rates was 3.51 OJo, the 6.580Jo 
nominal SM! rate from 1960-69 yielded only a 2.150Jo return rate. In addition, from 1970-75, 
with an average SM! rate of 9.340Jo, lenders earned only a I. 730Jo real rate of return. See Levin 
& Roberts, supra note 19, at 31-32. The PLAM, in contrast, would protect the lender's expected 
real rate of return by adjusting the mortgage debt according to actual inflation changes. See 
infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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actual changes in an inflation index. 29 Thus, a ten percent increase in 
inflation will cause the principal to increase by ten percent before 
payments are determined at a real interest rate. The real interest rate 
remains constant, but mortgage payments will change as the fixed in-
terest rate is applied to an adjusted principal base. In addition, the 
amortization term is adjusted yearly, giving a balloon effect to later 
payments.30 Although the PLAM payments will be relatively higher 
than SMI payments during later amortization years, 31 the PLAM bor-
rower should then be more capable of bearing the increased outlay. 
By removing the SMI tilting effect and the devaluation benefit arising 
in later years, the PLAM simulates mortgage financing in a world of 
no inflation where the real value of each payment over the mortgage 
term is equal. 
II. OBSTACLES TO PLAM FINANCING 
The PLAM must overcome many obstacles to be accepted in the 
mortgage finance community. Questions about interest regulation, tax 
consequences, default rates, and more must be answered to the satisfac-
tion of the lending community before PLAMs can receive serious con-
sideration. This section explores PLAM criticisms in detail, and explains 
how alleged flaws can be cured. 
A. Legal Considerations 
Federal and state-chartered lenders are subject to a panoply of statutes 
and regulations now effectively barring legal use of PLAMs. Federal 
tax laws also have a profound impact on the acceptability of PLAM 
financing, as does commercial negotiability of the PLAM note. 
1. Negative amortization- Negative amortization arises when a 
financing charge causes the accrued interest to exceed the monthly pay-
ment due. 32 Any unpaid accrued interest adds to the principal, with 
interest computed on the increased principal amount, and is reamortized 
over the shorter, remaining term. 33 In effect, the PLAM's principal 
balance increases as mortgage payments are made, though only during 
early years. 34 Negative amortization occurs during early PLAM pay-
29. Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 218. 
30. Using the 30-year, $50,000 mortgage with a 40Jo real interest rate, supra note 17, a l0OJo 
inflation rate would cause a payment of $34,802 in year 29, and $44,470 in the final year 30. 
See Cassidy, supra note 9, at 4. 
31. See id. at 5. 
32. Tucker, supra note 17, at 77. 
33. See Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 226-28; Comment, supra note 16, at 118-19. 
34. Taking as an example a 30-year, $50,000 PLAM at a 40Jo real rate of interest and I0OJo 
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ment years because PLAM payments at a real interest rate do not fully 
cover annual principal adjustments plus accrued interest on the ad-
justed principal balance due. 
a. Interest on interest- Various state statutes affect the practice 
of negative amortization, including regulation of compound interest, 35 
interest on interest, 36 and additions to principal. 37 Although the Federal 
Homes Loan Bank Board and the Comptroller of the Currency have 
issued rules preempting state laws that prohibit interest on interest, 38 
some state-chartered institutions might remain liable on these laws. 39 
PLAMs could also violate public policy prohibitions of compound 
interest. 40 
This potential liability can be remedied, however, by statutory or 
regulatory reforin. State legislatures or banking agencies could authorize 
annual inflation, the outstanding balance at the end of the first year would be $54,031; the outstand-
ing balance would rise to almost $160,000 in the twentieth year; it would then drop slowly for 
several years, followed by a precipitous payoff in the last two to three years, see supra note 
30 and accompanying text. See Cassidy, supra note 9, at 4. This trend can be seen in the follow-
ing figure (which also compares a standard fixed rate mortgage, or SFPM): 
Id. at 5. 
I 
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35. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 334.01 (West 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 47-14-09 (Smith 
Supp. 1981); N.Y. BANKING LAW§ 352(c) (McKinney Supp. 1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.05(l)(c) 
(West 1974 & Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 28-22-106 (1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 478-7, 8(d) 
(1976 & Supp. 1980). 
36. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1939 (West Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 438.101 (1978); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-09 (Smith Supp. 1981). 
37. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-109 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.05(l)(c) (West 
1974). 
38. See 46 Fed. Reg. 24,151-24,152 (1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 18,939, 18,944 (1981). 
39. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 334.01 (West 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 47-14-09 (Smith 
Supp. 1981); N. Y. BANKING LAW § 352(c) (McKinney 1971). 
40. See Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 227; see also R. KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW 
AND PRACTICE 90 (1975). 
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state-chartered lenders to make any loan within the powers of a 
federally-regulated institution; the federal preemption could then apply. 
Alternatively, legislatures could explicitly exempt AM Is from compound 
interest regulation. 41 
b. Loan-to-value ratios- Negative amortization may also violate 
federal and state loan-to-value ratios42 designed to keep borrowers from 
overextending themselves. The outstanding principal balance due on 
a PLAM might increase beyond statutory ceilings when housing price 
changes lag behind change in the PLAM inflation index. Even without 
a statutory loan-to-value restriction, lenders might avoid mortgages 
obligating borrowers to repay amounts greatly exceeding the market 
value of the realty securing repayment. 43 
The lender's security interest could be protected by requiring a reserve 
fund for loan payments once the debt exceeds the loan-to-value limit. 44 
Alternatively, the borrower could be forced to purchase mortgage in-
surance on any excess over the loan-to-value restriction. 45 Statutory 
restrictions should therefore be applied only where borrowers fail to 
alternatively secure amounts exceeding the statutory ceiling. 
c. Delayed equity accumulation- Negative amortization also has 
a more practical drawback: delayed equity. 46 Instead of developing 
equity by the end of the third or fourth year as in most SMis and 
some AMls, the PLAM's negative amortization, and consequent increase 
in principal balance due, postpones equity accumulation. 47 The early 
payments thus look more like expensive rent due to the absence of 
equity benefits. 
One way to avoid this practical drawback, or at least minimize the 
length of negative amortization periods, is to shorten the term of the 
PLAM note. 48 Earlier equity accumulation, however, demands higher 
41. See, e.g., Cow. REV. STAT.§ 11-41-115(5) (1981); IND. CODE ANN.§ 28-1-21.5-7 (West 
1980). 
42. See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 36,615 (1982) (noting the recently codified 125% limitation on 
the ratio of the loan balance to the original appraised value of the security property); ALASKA 
STAT. § 06.05.207(a)(4) (1981) (loan amount may not exceed 90% of appraised value of the real 
estate security); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-05 (1975) (real estate loan may not exceed 90% of 
the appraised value of the real estate security). 
43. Generally principal adjustments will not jeopardize the security interest because housing 
prices should also increase in response to inflation. If an oversupply of housing exists in a local 
market, however, real estate prices may increase at a lower relative rate, possibly leading to 
a debt that could not be fully recovered from the proceeds in a forced sale. 
44. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 722.326(1) (1981). 
45. See 47 Fed. Reg. 36,615 (1982). 
46. "Equity" is used in this Note to mean the fair market value that may be realized less 
the remaining mortgage debt. 
47. See supra note 33. Unless housing price increases exceed upward principal adjustments, 
the borrower actually owes more than the original principal due during early, negative amortiza-
tion years. 
48. Assuming a 30-year, $50,000 PLAM at a 3% real interest rate with 5% annual inflation, 
negative amortization occurs through the fifteenth year of the mortgage term. The principal balance 
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monthly payments. 49 Equity accumulation may also be increased by 
reducing the lender's real rate of return, so especially in conjunction 
with term reduction. 51 Lenders may, however, balk at financing the 
borrower's accelerated equity with a lower rate of return. Another solu-
tion is a higher downpayment, thus speeding equity accumulation by 
increasing the initial equity cushion and reducing mortgage payments 
overall. 
2. Usury- Because principal adjustments are charges in the nature 
of interest, 52 state usury restrictions on interest could apply to PLAMs. 
In 1980, however, Congress preempted state interest-rate limitations 
on a variety of federally related real property credit transactions. 53 The 
states have until early 1983 to decide whether to opt out of the federal 
scheme. 54 Because most first-mortgage loans on residential real prop-
erty are federally related loans, 55 the risk of usury violations exists only 
will not fall below the original mortgage amount until the beginning of the twenty-fourth year. 
If the PLAM term is reduced to 20 years, however, negative amortization occurs only through 
the fifth year, and the principal balance due falls below the original principal amount by the 
beginning of the ninth year of amortization. 
49. Using the example in note 48, the annual payment in the first year of the 30-year PLAM 
is $2,679. Under the 20-year PLAM, the first annual payment increases to $3,529. Increased 
first-year payments under the 20-year PLAM are still less than the $4,403 necessary in the first 
year of a 30-year, $50,000 SMI at a comparable 80Jo. 
50. The negative amortization period in note 48 increases from 15 years to 17 years when 
the real interest rate is increased to 5 OJo. 
51. Negative amortization in note 50 can be cut from 17 years to 8 years by making a 30-year 
note only a 20-year note, and dropping the real return from 50Jo to 30Jo. 
52. See infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text. 
53. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-221, 94 Stat. 132, 161 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1980)) [hereinafter cited as Monetary 
Control Act]. Federally-related loans include any loan: (!) made by any lender whose deposits 
or accounts are insured by any federal agency; (2) made by any lender regulated by any federal 
agency; (3) made by any lender approved by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment for participation in any mortgage insurance program; (4) made in whole or in part by 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development and insured, guaranteed, supplemented, 
or assisted in any way by the federal government; (5) eligible for purchase by the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association, Government National Mortgage Association or Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation; or (6) made in whole or in part by certain large real estate lenders that 
regularly extend credit payable by agreement in more than four installments. 12 C.F.R. § 590.2(b) 
(1982). 
The Monetary Control Act" preempts any state regulation of the amount of interest, finance 
charges or any other charges on any loan, mortgage, credit sale or advance which is secured 
by a first lien on residential real property, a purchase money lien on stock in a residential cooperative 
housing corporation or a first lien on a residential manufactured home. Id. § 590.2. 
54. Monetary Control Act, § 50l(b)(2) (1980). Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Nevada, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, and Wisconsin have overridden the preemp-
tion. (1981) CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 510 (1982). 
55. By the end of 1971, for example, 2,049 (370Jo) of the nation's 5,544 savings and loan 
associations were federally chartered and thereby regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board. Of the state-chartered associations, 2,222 were subject to federal regulation by virtue 
of Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation membership. Together, federal and insured 
state-chartered associations held 96.90Jo of all savings and loan association assets. J. WHITE, 
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in states opting out of the federal preemption. Moreover, even absent 
the usury preemption, federally chartered savings and loan association 
PLAMs are exempt from usury laws because Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board regulation preempts all state laws restricting member use of ad-
justable mortgage loans. 56 
Even for PLAMs that remain subject to usury limitations, many may 
not be necessarily usurious. For example, the real interest rate plus 
the principal adjustments may not exceed the usury ceiling. In addi-
tion, even if interest charges in later years exceed the maximum per-
missible annual level, most states will allow an otherwise authorized 
loan if interest payments averaged over the entire mortgage term stay 
within usury limits. 57 
3. Tax treatment of principal adjustments- PLAMs could prove 
to be unpopular if borrowers cannot keep the residential mortgage in-
terest deduction from federal income tax 58 now available with SM Is 
and most AMis. 59 If principal adjustments used in PLAMs are not 
considered deductible interest charges, the PLAM borrower will be 
unable to deduct the inflation adjustment, a considerable loss during 
negative amortization periods. 60 Because the Internal Revenue Code 
and Regulations do not define interest6 ' it cannot be certain that PLAM 
principal adjustments qualify as a deductible expense. Nevertheless, 
federal courts generally define interest as the compensation allowed 
by law or fixed by parties for the use or forbearance of money. 62 PLAM 
principal adjustments should qualify because they indemnify the lender 
against inflationary loss and compensate the lender for the use of the 
BANKING LAW 43 (1976). These associations would be subject to the federally related loan defini-
tions. 12 C.F.R. § 590.2(b)(l), (2) (1982). A substantial number of national and state commercial 
banks, nondeposit trust companies, and mutual savings banks are also subject to federal regula-
tion and insurance protection and thereby governed by the Monetary Control Act. For example, 
by the end of 1980, 96.3-"o of the nation's banks were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 222 (1981). This figure includes 
9,336 insured state-chartered banks not members of the Federal Reserve System. Id. 
Loans that are not made by federally assisted insured or regulated lenders would likely be 
considered federally related loans under the broad language extending the Monetary Control 
Act to any entity that regularly extends, or arranges for the extension of, credit payable by agree-
ment in more than four installments, subject to a few exceptions. 12 C.F.R. § 590.2(b)(6) (1982). 
56. Adjustable Mortgage Loan Instruments, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148, 24,152 (1981). 
57. See, e.g., Barnes v. Huck, 97 Idaho 173, 540 P .2d 1352 (1975); Podell, The Application 
of Usury Laws to Modern Real Estate Transactions, l REAL Esr. L.J. 136, 144-45 (1972). 
58. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1981); Treas. Reg. § 1-163-l(b) (CCH 1957). 
59. See, e.g., Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 237. 
60. See supra note 33. 
61. See Treas. Reg. § l.61-7(a) (CCH 1957). 
62. See, e.g., Old Colony R.R.-Co. v. Comm'r, 284 U.S. 552 (1932) (bond premium received 
by corporation from bondholders is income); Kena, Inc. v. Comm'r, 44 B.T.A. 217 (1941) (amount 
received pursuant to contract covering loan of a principal sum and measured by percentage of 
profits earned by debtor constitutes interest); Fall River Elec. Light Co. v. Comm'r, 23 B.T.A. 
168 (1931) (bond premium constitutes taxable income). 
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mortgage principal. 63 
Several tax accounting problems arise under negative amortization. 
During periods of negative amortization, the amount of accrued in-
terest exceeding payment in a given year will be added to the princi-
pal, but IRS regulations provide that a taxpayer using the cash receipts 
and disbursements method of accounting must take into account 
allowable deductions for the taxable year "in which paid. " 64 Interest 
in excess of loan repayments would not be deductible in that tax year; 
interest, though incurred, is not "paid", 65 and increasing a debt to 
satisfy an interest liability is not considered payment of interest. 66 
The Tax Court and Internal Revenue Service have held that, absent 
a bona fide agreement to the contrary, partial payments under the cash 
method apply first to reduce interest due and then reduce principal. 67 
Although the PLAM borrower is entitled to the same deduction benefits 
as the SMI borrower, the PLAM borrower must carry-over and deduct 
interest payments incurred, but not yet paid, in subsequent tax years. 
Tax accounting for lenders is also complicated by negative amortiza-
tion. A lender on the accrual method of accounting must report in-
terest income in the tax year that the lender accrues the right to the 
interest, 68 regardless of the amount actually paid by the borrower in 
that tax year. 69 Consequently, the accrual-basis lender would be re-
quired to pay income taxes not on the cash actually received, but on 
63. See, e.g., Arthur R. Jones Syndicate v. Comm'r, 23 F.2d 833, (7th Cir. 1927) (payments 
of amounts as interest are deductible regardless of name given the payments); Rev. Rul. 69-188, 
1969-1 C.B. 54, as amended by Rev. Rul. 69-582, 1969-2 C.B. 29 (to qualify as interest for 
tax purposes, a payment must be compensation for the use or forebearance of money, regardless 
of whether the payment is labelled as interest); cf. Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 238-39 n.103 
(suggesting that a revenue ruling be gotten before proceeding on PLAMs). 
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-l(a)(l) (CCH 1957). 
65. Recent opinions have narrowly construed the terms "paid" or "payment" for purposes 
of an interest deduction. In Don E. Williams, Co. v. Comm'r, 429 U.S. 569 (1977), the Supreme 
Court held that an accrual-basis corporate taxpayer that delivered fully secured promissory notes 
to trustees of a qualified employees' profit-sharing trust was not entitled to I.R.C. § 404(a) deduc-
tions. Although the notes had value and qualified as income to a seller-recipient, the notes re-
mained only a promise by the maker to pay and did not constitute an outlay of cash or property. 
Id. at 578-79, 582-83. See also Battlestein v. IRS, 611 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that 
future advances of interest made by the lender when the borrower owed interest payments in 
that same amount would not constitute I.R.C. § 163(a) interest payment). 
66. See Kanter, The Interest Deduction: When and How Does It Work, 26 INST. ON FED. 
TAX'N 87, 90 (1968). For other authority holding that a cash-basis taxpayer is not treated as 
having paid interest where payment is made with his own note, see Hart v. Comm'r, 54 F.2d 
848 (1st Cir. 1932); Rev. Rul. 70-647, 197~2 C.B. 38; Rev. Rul. 77-134, 1977-1 C.B. 132. See 
also Englard v. Comm'nr, 34 T.C. 617,621 (1960) (no deduction allowed where interest is paid 
by an increase in the original principal). · 
67. In re Maxine Dev. Co., Inc. (1963) 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 163,300; Rev. Rul. 63-57, 1963-1 
C.B. 103; Rev. Rul. 7~7. 197~2 C.B. 38; Rev. Rul. 77-134, 1977-1 C.B. 132. 
68. "Under an accrual method of accounting, income is includible in gross income when 
all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof 
can be determined with reasonable accuracy." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-l(a) (CCH 1957). 
69. Rev. Rul. 77-135, 1977-1 C.8. 132. 
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the increased (i.e., inflated) value of the mortgage asset. In the rare 
case of a lender on the cash receipts and disbursements method of 
accounting, interest would be reported as income in the year payments 
are actually received. 
4. Negotiability- The primary lender's ability to market the long-
term PLAM instrument to investors will influence lender participation 
in PLAM financing. A viable secondary mortgage market70 enables 
primary lenders to replenish mortgage capital by selling mortgage loans 
at a profit to investors shortly after mortgage origination and recycling 
those mortgage sale proceeds to new borrowers. 11 Without a viable 
secondary market for PLAMs, however, lenders would turn to other, 
more negotiable mortgage instruments. 
A viable secondary mortgage market depends upon PLAM notes 
being negotiable. If they are not, the secondary purchaser cannot become 
a holder in due course12 and take the note free of certain defenses, 73 
but rather would take subject to personal defenses available to the bor-
rower against the original lender. 74 The lack of holder in due course 
status will make it difficult for the primary lender to profitably dispose 
of the PLAM note in the secondary market. 75 
The negotiability of PLAM instruments depends upon their being 
in writing and containing "an unconditional promise or order to pay 
a sum certain in money." 76 The variable principal provision in a PLAM 
promissory note arguably fails to satisfy the sum certain requirement. 77 
70. The secondary mortgage market has existed for over forty years. Thrift institutions use 
the secondary market to sell debt instruments to other thrift institutions, pension funds, life 
insurance companies and various trusts. The Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA") 
was established as a government corporation in 1938 to create a market for federally-assisted 
housing-program mortgage instruments. In 1968, FNMA was split into two separate corpora-
tions: the FNMA continued as a privately owned and managed corporation, and the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association ("GNMA") was created within the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development to purchase federally-insured or guaranteed mortgages and purchase 
conventional loans during economic emergencies to stimulate housing construction. GNMA is 
also authorized to conduct a mortgage-backed securities program under which the Association 
guarantees securities based on a pool of mortgages held by the primary lender. In 1970, Congress 
established the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation to create a secondary mortgage market 
for conventional loans. See FED. HOME LOAN BANK BoARD, THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 
1-2 (n.d.). 
11. Id. at 1; Plant & Jannuzzi, Secondary Market Aspects of AM/s, in 2 AMIRS, supra 
note 9, at Xl-1 (1977). 
72. u.c.c. § 3-302. 
73. Id. § 3-305(2). 
14. Id. § 3-306 (breach of warranty, fraud in the inducement, or any other defense not listed 
in § 3-305(2)). 
15. See, e.g., Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 231-32; Ege, Legal Implications of AMl's, 
in 3 AMIRS, supra note 9, at XX-61-62 (1977); Hirschberg, Value Clauses: Forms of Contractual 
Protection Against Changes of Values of Money, 19 CoM. L.J. 350, 352 (1974). 
76. u.c.c. § 3-104(1)(b). 
77. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 16, at 121; Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 231; Cowan 
& Foley, supra note 9, at 1086. 
Comment l to U.C.C. § 3-106 requires that a "sum certain" must result from a computation 
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Nevertheless, though on its face the indexed note may not provide 
mathematical certainty, PLAM inflation clauses do provide adequate 
commercial certainty because future payments have the same "real" 
value as initial payments. 78 
Even if they do not satisfy the sum certain requirement, PLAMs 
may be made negotiable by contract. 79 Notwithstanding U.C.C. com-
ments forbidding turning a non-negotiable instrument into a negotiable 
instrument by contract, 80 where parties have indicated a clear intent 
and a particular purpose to confer negotiability on a note, courts may 
rule in favor of negotiability. 81 States can avoid this negotiability prob-
lem by enacting legislation either expressly conferring negotiability on 
indexed mortgage instruments or permitting parties to agree to negotia-
bility. 82 
Thrift institutions could entirely avoid the negotiability problems of . 
the PLAM note merely by issuing PLAM-backed securities. 83 PLAM 
primary lenders might issue straight pass-through securities paying a 
proportionate share of principal and interest collected, minus servic-
ing fees and other costs. 84 The negotiability issue is avoided because 
the secondary-market investor purchases a newly created and more readi-
ly transferable security, not the non-negotiable PLAM note. 
that can be made from the instrument itself without reference to an outside source. Therefore, 
reliance on a price index outside the PLAM note to determine mortgage payments would seem 
to violate the sum certain requirement. Some courts have thus held that variable interest mort-
gages are !!On-negotiable. w. HAWKLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER 23 (1979). These cases should 
be analagous for PLAMs, because principal adjustments are charges in the nature of interest. 
78. See Hirschberg, supra note 75, at 352; see also Hauser, The Use of Index Clauses in 
Private Loans: A Comparative Study, 7 AM. J. COMP. L. 350, 356-57 (1958). See generally 
Dawson & Coultrap, Contracting By Reference To Price Indices, 33 MICH. L. REV. 685, 698-99 
(1935). 
79. See, e.g., Dawson & Coultrap, supra note 78, at 698-99; Hauser, supra note 78, at 357-58; 
Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 231-32. 
80. U.C.C. § 3-104 comment 2 (1979). 
81. Hauser, supra note 78, at 358; see also Dawson & Coultrap, supra note 78, at 698-99. 
The U.C.C. comments leave open the possibility that some writings might be made negotiable 
by judicial decision. U.C.C. § 3-104 comment I (1978). Some commentators doubt, however, 
that negotiability can be conferred merely by expressing an intent to that effect. See, e.g., 
Nussbaum, Multiple Currency and Index Clauses, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 569, 594 (1936). 
82. Hauser, supra note 78, at 358; see also Dawson & Coultrap, supra note 78, at 698. The 
U.C.C. comments also leave open the possibility that some writings may be made negotiable 
by statute. U.C.C. § 3-104 comment I (1978). State courts might permit otherwise non-negotiable 
instruments to become negotiable where the underlying instrument meets statutory requirements 
or falls within some statutory exception. See, e.g., Brazos River Authority v. Carr, 405 S.W.2d 
689, 695 (Tex. 1966). 
83. See Comment, supra note 16, at 121. The Government National Mortgage Association, 
for example, is authorized "to guarantee the timely payment of principal of and interest on 
securities . . . based on and backed by a trust or pool . . . of mortgages . . . insured by the 
Federal Housing Administration or the Farmers' Home Administration, or insured or guaranteed 
by the Veterans Administration." 24 C.F.R. § 390.1 (1981). 
84. Id. § 390.5(a). 
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Lenders could also maintain a secondary market by guaranteeing 
investors against any loss attributable to the absence of holder in due 
course status. 85 Alternatively, the borrowers could execute a waiver 
or estoppel certificate providing the benefits of holder in due course 
status in favor of a subsequent purchaser. 86 
5. Lien priority- A mortgage represents a lien on real property 
in favor of the mortgage lender enabling the lender upon the borrower's 
default to sell the realty and apply the proceeds to the debt. 87 Lien 
priority is important because senior liens take first out of any forced-
sale proceeds. 88 
Under an SMI, the lien equals the amount of the initial principal 
advance. Because the outstanding debt falls continually from the first 
payment, the initial lien always exceeds the value of the debt, thus 
giving the lienholder complete priority to forced-sale proceeds. Under 
a PLAM, however, the outstanding debt increases over a substantial 
portion of the loan term due to negative amortization. The lender may 
thus incur the risk that the lien on the original principal will not cover 
the increasing mortgage asset. Consequently, the lender's claim to the 
security beyond the initial advance amount might be subordinate, at 
least in part, to the claims of an intervening lienor. 89 
The priority problem arises because the PLAM could be viewed as 
an agreement to enter periodically into subsequent agreements to deter-
mine the borrower's outstanding obligation. 90 If each extension is viewed 
separately, intervening credit agreements with third parties would achieve 
lien priority over any renegotiated increases unless the PLAM was 
perfected after each renegotiation before the third party records. 91 The 
better view of priority status, however, considers principal adjustments 
to be future advances secured by the PLAM. 92 The PLAM thus effect-
85. Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 233-34. 
86. See id. at 234; Comment, supra note 16, at 121. 
87. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 
90 (2d ed. 1981); see also w. BRYANT, MORTGAGE LENDING: FUNDAMENTALS AND PRACTICES 
218-19 (1962). 
88. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & 0. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 92 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as G. OSBORNE). 
89. In the hypothetical PLAM, supra note 48, the original lien would be for $50,000, the 
principal amount. If in the eighth year, when the principal stands at $60,064, the borrower ob-
tained a loan from a second creditor, that loan arguably has priority as to the excess over $50,000 
secured by the first lien. Should the borrower default on both obligations in the tenth year, 
when the principal stands at $61,818, the mortgage lender might need all the proceeds to cover 
the debt but would have priority only in the first $50,000: 
90. Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 234. 
91. Id. at 234-35; see also Barnett, Alternative Mortgage Instruments: How To Maintain 
Secured Lender Status, 96 BANKING L.J. 6, 23 (1979). 
92. See G. OSBORNE, supra note 88, at 756; Barnett, supra note 91, at 24; Ege, supra note 
75, at XX-19; Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 235. 
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ively states the amount of the initial advance and that future indeter-
minate advances are also secured. 93 
Specific state future-advance statutes may, however, further com-
plicate PLAM financing by requiring a definitive statement in the mort-
gage instrument of the amount to be advanced. 94 Because annual 
principal adjustments are unpredictable, the lender could not definitively 
state the amount of the PLAM advance. PLAM financing would also 
be impaired in jurisdictions extending priority only to the extent that 
the aggregate outstanding obligation does not exceed the amount of 
the original indebtedness. 95 Moreover, several states require future ad-
vances to be made within a time period exceeded by the PLAM term. 96 
These difficulties could be remedied by amending future-advance statutes 
to provide that any adjustable mortgage loan providing additions to 
either principal or interest shall be superior to any subsequent loan 
to the borrower for any other purpose. 97 
B. Underwriting Considerations of PLAM Financing 
Even reforming every legal barrier to PLAM financing will not make 
PLAMs viable mortgage instruments if practical underwriting difficulties 
93. G. OSBORNE, supra note 88, at 757. In most states a properly recorded obligatory future 
advance, mandated by the mortgage instrument, gives the lender first priority from the date 
of the instrument regardless of the mortgage lender's actual or constructive notice of an inter-
vening lienor. Id.; Comment, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances: Problems of Priority and 
the Doctrine of Economic Necessity, 46 MISS. L.J. 433, 437 (1975). When the advance is merely 
optional, liowever, such as where disbursements are made at the discretion of the lender, inter-
vening liens attain priority in a majority of states if the mortgage lender has actual knowledge 
of the intervening lien but makes the advance anyway. G. OSBORNE, supra note 88, at 759; 
Barnett, supra note 91, at 25; Comment, supra, at 437. A substantial number of jurisdictions 
give priority to intervening lienors when the mortgage lender has mere constructive knowledge 
of the intervening lien and makes the disbursement anyway. Barnett, supra note 91, at 25; Com-
ment, supra, at 437-38. 
Nevertheless, a significant number of jurisdictions have rejected this common law approach 
and given original mortgage priority even to optional advances. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 
25, § 2118(a) (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.04(1) (Harrison Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. 
STAT. § 407-83 (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9B, § 436 (1980); MD. REAL PROP. 
CODE ANN. § 7-102(b) (1981); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-238.01 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-9 
(1978); S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976). PLAM lenders would, however, be better 
protected if they made all principal adjustments obligatory rather than optional. 
94. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2336 (1976); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9B, § 436 (1980); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 51A.38 (West. Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-206(1) (1981); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 76-238.01 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-9 (1978). 
95. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE§ 3136 (West 1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479:4 (1968); 
s.c. CODE ANN. § 29-3-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1207 (1970). 
96. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2118 (1980) (within 5 years); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 697.04(1) (Harrison Supp. 1981) (within 20 years); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.055(2) (Vernon Supp. 
1982) (within 10 years). 
97. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 407-83 (Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 28-1-21.5 -.7 (West 
1980). 
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cannot be ameliorated. Certain commercial risks must be minimized 
before PLAMs will receive widespread application. 
1. Increased risk of delinquency and foreclosure- The PLAM 
lender, like the SMI lender, will not approve a loan without assurances 
that the borrower will have sufficient income over the mortgage term 
to repay the loan. If the PLAM borrower's ability to repay does not 
increase with increased PLAM payments, the risk of default will 
increase. 98 If the borrower's income does not keep pace with inflation, 
inflation-compensating principal adjustments will increase the real cost 
of the PLAM loan, and impose an ever-greater financial burden on 
the borrower. 99 This increased risk of loss could discourage primary 
and secondary market interest in PLAMs. Because a borrower with 
insignificant equity has little to lose in the event of default, delayed 
equity accumulation during negative amortization may exacerbate the 
risk of default and foreclosure. 
The PLAM contract can, however, provide for adjustments where 
household income does not increase with inflation. For instance, PLAM 
adjustments could be set at some fraction of the change of the infla-
tion index, 100 though the lender would likely require a higher contract 
interest rate, including a moderate inflation premium. 101 The PLAM 
term could also be increased to decrease monthly payments, 102 though 
this would mean increasing negative amortization, reducing equity ac-
cumulation, and requiring a greater payback over the entire loan term. 
2. Risky asset-to-liability ratios- Thrift institutions operate as 
financial intermediaries in mortgage markets, directing funds from 
household and institutional savers to mortgage borrowers. 103 Thrift in-
stitution real estate profits roughly equal the amount by which the return 
on mortgage assets paid to the lender exceed the amounts paid by the 
lender to depositors. 104 Because most mortgage funds come from short-
term rate-sensitive deposit accounts, 105 lenders run the risk of a maturity 
,mismatch when monthly mortgage asset earnings fall short of monthly 
98. See Follain & Struyk, Homeownership Effects of Alternative Mortgage Instruments, in 
3 AMIRS, supra note 9, at XIV-9; see also Tucker, supra note 17, at 76. The annual rate of 
income increase need not, however, equal the annual inflation increase. Because principal ad-
justments occur at the end of a given year and are based on inflation changes during the preceding 
year, the borrower has two years of adjusted income to compensate for each principal adjust-
ment. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 10. 
99. Conversely, if inflation affects all prices and incomes equally, the real rate of interest 
to the borrower remains unchanged. See Swain, Alternative Mortgage Instruments and Mortgage 
Defaults, in 2 AMIRS, supra· note 9, at IX-23. 
100. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 6, 10. 
101. Id. at 6. 
102. Id. at 10. See also supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
103. See Hyer & Kearl, supra note 9, at 212-13. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
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deposit liabilities. 106 To attract and retain loanable funds thrift institu-
tions must increase deposit account rates, but the then-necessary in-
creased return on mortgage assets can be obtained only on new loans 
or existing renegotiable and variable rate mortgages. 101 As a result, 
lenders are forced to seek particularly high rates on new loans to sub-
sidize older fixed-rate mortgage portfolios. 108 
PLAM lenders could encounter unusually risky debt-to-asset ratios 
during initial amortization periods if mortgage capital is raised through 
nominal interest deposit accounts; early real rate mortgage payments 
to the lender will surely be less than account rates that must be paid 
to the short-term depositors. 109 The lender's initial cash flow problem 
can be remedied, however, by establishing price level adjusted deposit 
accounts ("PLADs"). 110 PLAD certificate of deposit or savings ac-
count holders would be guaranteed a real rate of return on their in-
vestment. As with the PLAM, the PLAD deposit principal would be 
adjusted periodically according to changes in an inflation index. 111 
PLADs should be attractive to household and institutional investors. 112 
A PLAD would off er small savers a hedge against price level changes 
during periods of substantial inflation. PLADs might be particularly 
106. During the post-1965 inflation period, mortgage lending was seriously disrupted as lenders 
were increasingly unable to attract and retain savings deposits due to the development and suc-
cessful marketing of alternative savings instruments paying relatively higher yields. See DEP'T 
OF THE TREASURY, THE REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON THRIFT INSTITUTIONS 3-4 
(Committee Print 1980); see also DEP'T OF TREASURY, DEPOSIT INTEREST RATE CEILINGS AND 
HOUSING CREDIT: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON REGULATION 
Q 61-97 (1979). Institutions were further hampered because sizable portions of their investment 
portfolios contained old mortgage assets at interest rates far lower than the prevailing cost of 
raising money in the open market. See THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON FINANC-
IAL STRUCTURE & REGULATION 18 (1971); Usury Lending Limits: Hearings on s. 1988 Before 
the Senate .Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1979) 
(statement of John Heimann); Outlook for Housing, supra note 3, at 23 (statement of Saul 
Clamen). Institutions obtained a large portion of loan funds through short-run rate-sensitive 
deposits, but loaned to mortgagors over a long term. This led to a maturity mismatch because 
liabilities were not adequately covered by assets. 
107. See M. MADISON & J. DWYER, supra note 7, § 2.0l[i]lb), at 2-4 n.6. 
108. Levin & Roberts, supra note 19, at 31. 
109. Consider a $50,000 deposit liability used to provide a $50,000 30-year PLAM. The lender 
will receive $2,678.55 at the conclusion of the first year of amortization at a 30Jo real interest 
rate and 50Jo inflation. Any deposit account paying more than 5.360Jo during this period would 
generate a net loss to the lender. The average cost of funds for the nation's federally-chartered 
savings and loan associations in 1980, however, was more than 8.90Jo. FED. HOME LOAN BANK 
BOARD, supra note I, at 107. The average return on all mortgages for this period was over 9.30Jo. 
Id. at 108. 
110. See Lessard & Modigliani, supra note 9, at 36; Sharplin, supra note 16, at 55-56; see 
also Cohn & Fischer, supra note 13, at 41-52. 
111. Due to the gradual phase-out of controls fixing the maximum amount of interest paid 
by financial institutions, Monetary Control Act, supra note 53, § 202(b), unrestrirted PLAD 
savings accounts could be available effective March 31, 1986. 
112. See Cohn & Fischer, supra note 13, at 51; Lessard & Modigliani, supra note 9, at 36. 
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appropriate for trusts, corporate pension funds, and profit-sharing funds 
that have a long investment horizon and a need for inflation protection. 
CONCLUSION 
State and federally regulated real estate mortgage lenders offer a 
variety of alternative mortgage instruments to correct the effects of 
high, inflated interest rates on homeowners. The price level adjusted 
mortgage offers a limited group of upwardly mobile purchasers, not 
otherwise able to afford initial mortgage payments, an opportunity to 
buy a home. When various banking statutes and conventional lending 
practices are modified as suggested in this Note, PLAMs will be available 
to fill an important home financing need. 
-Joel J. Goldberg 
